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Abstract
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and
firms. The liquidity services of bank deposits make deposits a “cheaper” source of
funding than equity. In equilibrium, banks pass on part of this funding advantage in
the form of lower interest rates to firms that borrow from them. Firms and banks
choose their capital structures to balance the benefits of debt financing against the
risk of costly default. An increase in the equity of a firm makes its debt less risky
and that in turn reduces the risk of the banks who lend to the firm. Hence there
is some substitutability between firm and bank equity. We find that firms have a
comparative advantage in providing a buffer against systemic shocks, whereas banks
have a comparative advantage in providing a buffer against idiosyncratic shocks.
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Bank capital plays a central role in assuring the safety and soundness of the banking system.
Recent work has begun to recognize the general equilibrium dimension of the capital structure
decision. Firms and banks choose their capital structures independently, but the firms’
decisions have implications for both firms and banks. The riskiness of a bank loan depends
on the capital structure of the firm to which it is made. Risk originates in the corporate
sector and flows down to the banking sector. Firm equity acts as a buffer that absorbs shocks
and prevents costly financial distress. A highly leveraged firm is more likely to experience
financial distress, other things being equal, than a firm with low leverage. The more equity
there is in a firm’s capital structure, the “safer”the bank lending to that firm will be. Hence,
the “safety and soundness”of banks depends on the capital structures of their borrowers,
as well as on their own capital structures. In this sense, the equity component of a firm’s
capital structure does double duty: it protects the firm against default and it shields the
lending bank from default. This general effect– the “supply chain”of finance, as Gornall
and Strebulaev (2017) call it– explains why the effi cient allocation of equity capital between
the banking and corporate sectors is a general equilibrium problem.
Our main objective is to investigate the effi cient allocation of equity capital between
the banking and corporate sectors in a competitive general equilibrium setting. We study
an economy consisting of consumers, firms and banks. Consumers are the initial owners
of capital goods and the ultimate buyers of consumption goods. Firms have access to a
variety of risky technologies, which use capital equipment to produce consumption goods.
Firms issue equity to households and borrow from banks in order to fund the purchase of
capital equipment and choose which technology to operate. Banks issue equity and deposits
to households to fund loans to firms and choose the composition of their loan portfolio.
Households purchase equity and make deposits in banks to fund their future consumption.
Only households can invest in equity.
Firms and banks are restricted in the securities they can issue. Firms are restricted to
issuing debt and equity. Banks are restricted to taking deposits and issuing equity. In this
sense, markets are incomplete. Nonetheless, the set of potential securities that can be issued
is large because the risk characteristics of these securities depend on the decisions taken by
firms and banks. If firms choose different technologies or capital structures, they change
the risk characteristics of their debt and equity. Similarly, if banks choose different loan
portfolios or capital structures, they change the risk characteristics of their deposits and
equity. In this sense, firms and banks are engaged in a security design problem and the
result is a large array of potential securities that need to be priced and traded. We assume
that competitive markets exist for all potential securities. In this sense, markets for potential
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securities are complete.
Two non-standard assumptions are crucial for our results. The first is that default is
costly. We model this very simply by assuming that, in the event of default, a bank or firm
loses a fraction of its value. If financial distress were not costly, default would be a matter of
indifference. The second assumption is that bank deposits yield a liquidity premium because
they circulate as “money.”We model this very simply by assuming that consumers get extra
utility if they pay for consumption with deposits. Without this assumption, there would be
no need for banks. More precisely, the liquidity premium allows banks to borrow “cheaply,”
that is, the return on deposits is lower than the return on equity. This cheap funding makes
it possible for banks to offer loans to firms at attractive rates that compensate for the risk of
financial distress. Without the liquidity premium, there would be no demand for bank loans
and no need for banks. Costly default and a liquidity premium on deposits are suffi cient to
ensure the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold and that capital structures “matter”for
banks or firms. Furthermore, even though, for the reasons explained above, there is some
substitutability between equity in firms and in banks, we will see that firms and banks have
their own comparative advantage when it comes to using equity as a buffer against default.
The first contribution of this paper is to provide a benchmark model where the con-
strained effi cient asset composition and equity capital of banks and firms is decentralized
by a market system, where each firm and bank independently maximizes its market value.
The challenge is casting the model in a competitive general equilibrium framework. We
assume away the usual frictions (imperfect competition, asymmetric information, etc.) but
the model is rich in pecuniary externalities. Nonetheless, with a large enough set of poten-
tial security markets, decentralization of the constrained-effi cient allocation is possible. The
assumptions needed are not innocuous, however, as we discuss more fully in Section 3. We
use constrained effi ciency to characterize the equilibrium level of equity capital in firms and
banks and show how it depends on the technology shocks that impact the economy.
The second contribution is to show that in the special case of co-monotonic technologies,
it is socially optimal to allocate all equity capital to the corporate sector. A set of technologies
is co-monononic if the individual productivities are monotonically increasing in the state of
nature. In this case, bank equity is dominated by firm equity and banks hold zero equity
capital. This result highlights the comparative advantage of firm equity in buffering systemic
shocks: firm equity provides a buffer against default for both banks and firms because it
absorbs risk at the source, where the shock first hits the system.
This leads to our third contribution: why do banks need to hold equity capital? Our
result for co-monotonic technologies suggests that positive bank capital is only effi cient if
firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We don’t have general results because
the presence of non-convexities makes it very diffi cult to get a complete characterization of
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equilibrium outside the co-monotonic case. We show first that a positive level of bank equity
is optimal in a one factor model, that is simpler in some respects than the environment
considered in the rest of the paper but also closer to the literature. The result is then
extended to the more general set-up of the paper, for some examples of technology shocks
for which equilibria that can be solved explicitly.
The optimality of bank equity arises when the probability that any given technology
receives a negative productivity shock is relatively small while the probability that some
technologies receive a shock is relatively large. In that case, a bank can reduce its risk by
diversifying its portfolio of loans across firms using different technologies, but only if it holds
equity to buffer against these shocks. The bank has a comparative advantage relative to
firms in providing an equity buffer against these shocks for two reasons. First, it only needs
to hold a small amount of equity because, in any state, only a small fraction of its diversified
portfolio is affected. Second, because there is often some type of firm that is defaulting,
the bank’s equity buffer is more likely to be required than a firms’equity buffer. We then
identify conditions under which both banks and firms will issue equity as well as conditions
under which only banks issue equity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the economy and
the competitive equilibrium notion. In Section 3 we show the welfare properties of equilibria.
Section 4 examines the properties of banks’capital structure in equilibrium. First, Section
4.1 shows that bank capital is positive in the single factor model with idiosyncratic risk
and diversified portfolios. Section 4.2 considers the case of co-monotonic technologies while
Section 4.3 studies an environment where productivity shocks have also an idiosyncratic
component. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are collected in the appendix.
1.1 Related literature
Under conditions provided byModigliani andMiller (1958), capital structure is indeterminate
and has no effect on the value of the firm. A large literature has grown up investigating the
role of various factors, such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, term structure, seniority and incentive
problems, in the choice of corporate capital structure (Brennan and Schwartz, 1978; Barnea,
Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Kim, 1982; Titman, 1984; Dammon and Green, 1987; Titman
and Wessels, 1988; Leland and Toft, 1996; Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 2011; Hackbarth and
Mauer, 2012). The Modigliani-Miller Theorem does not hold in our model either: the optimal
capital structure is determined by a trade-off between the costs of financial distress and the
funding advantage of debt, due to the liquidity premium on deposits.
Evidence that the costs of default can be substantial for both banks and non-financial
firms is found in James (1991), Andrade and Kaplan (1998), and Korteweg (2010). More
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recent work suggests that earlier estimates may have understated the true costs of default
(Almeida and Philippon, 2007; Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan, 2007). The default costs in
our model are deadweight losses, as distinct from the fire sale “losses”in Gale and Gottardi
(2015), which are merely transfers of value to buyers.
The empirical literature on the relationship between a bank’s capital structure and its
market value is not large. Flannery and Rangan (2008) examined changes in banks’capital
structure in the previous decade. Mehran and Thakor (2011) found a positive relationship
between bank value and bank capital in a cross section of banks. Gropp and Heider (2010)
found that the determinants of bank capital structure were similar to those of non-financial
firms, although the levels of equity are different.
The theoretical work on bank capital structure is also quite limited. Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) and Diamond (1984) show that deposits constitute the optimal form of funding to
provide liquidity insurance to depositors or delegated monitoring for investors. Gale (2004)
extends the Diamond-Dybvig model to include bank capital that provides additional risk
sharing between risk neutral equity holders and risk averse depositors. The importance of
the liquidity services provided by deposits has been emphasized, more recently, by Stein
(2012) and De Angelo and Stulz (2015).
Van den Heuvel (2008) studies a quantitative model in which bank capital structure is
determined by the trade-off between the moral hazard costs associated with risk shifting
behavior and the liquidity services of bank debt, assuming that deposits yield direct utility
benefits. DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) also highlight the liquidity premium earned by bank
deposits, contrasting it with the costs of intermediation.
Gornall and Strebulaev (2017), henceforth GS, provide a quantitative analysis of a partial
equilibrium model in which the capital structures of banks and the firms that borrow from
them are endogenously determined, weighing the tax advantage of debt against the costs of
default. They find that the value maximizing leverage in the banking sector is much higher
than in the corporate sector. They attribute this to the fact that banks are less risky than
firms. First, banks hold senior claims (debt), so the first loss falls on corporate shareholders.
Second, banks reduce their portfolio risk by diversifying across firms. In the environment
considered, these two factors are suffi cient to produce realistic levels of bank capital.
There are some important differences between our model and GS. In GS, the use of debt–
by banks and firms– is motivated by the tax hedge on interest income. This implies that the
interaction between firms and banks centers around the allocation of the tax benefits, while
in our set-up it operates primarily on the default risk dimension. Furthermore, as a result of
the distortionary tax, the equilibrium allocation is ineffi cient. The ineffi ciency could easily
be removed by changing the tax code to treat so debt and equity symmetrically. But in that
case, banks would have no funding advantage and firms would be funded entirely by equity.
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Another feature of the GS model is the assumption that banks hold symmetric portfolios
consisting of loans diversified across all firms. As we show in our model, this is not always
the optimal choice of banks, because of the non-convexities associated with the possibility
of costly default.
Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2015), henceforth ACM, motivated the present paper. Like
us, they assume that banks and firms can only issue debt/deposits and equity. They also
assume that markets for deposits and equity are segmented: some consumers can only hold
deposits, whereas others can hold equity. Depositors have lower outside options than equity
investors, so in equilibrium the depositors receive a lower return than the equity investors.
Equity is therefore an “expensive”source of funding.
ACM characterize the capital structures of banks and firms, when they are chosen jointly
to maximize total expected surplus, taking as given the expected returns demanded by the
holders of equity and deposits, respectively. This optimal contracting approach guarantees
the effi ciency of these choices. In our framework, by contrast, effi ciency is a property of a
decentralized competitive equilibrium when markets are open for all possible types of debt
and equity.
ACM also derive the result that bank equity has zero value, for the special case where
firms’returns are perfectly correlated and uniformly distributed. In that case, the bank is
simply a pass-through for the shocks affecting the firms’returns and the bank will default
only if the firms it lends to default. As a result, putting all the equity in the firms minimizes
the probability of default for both banks and firms. Our analysis generalizes this result and
shows that only when one allows for a greater degree of generality in the structure of the
technology shocks one can understand the possible benefits of bank equity.
There is a large theoretical literature analyzing the role of equity in preventing risk
shifting or asset substitution. Our assumption of symmetric information rules out this kind
of incentive problem.
Our competitive equilibrium model is related to the literature on the theory of the firm in
incomplete markets, developed by Diamond (1967), Ekern andWilson (1974), Radner (1974),
Drèze (1974), and Grossman and Hart (1979). In the earlier literature, firms are fully owned
by shareholders and the equilibrium value of a firm is determined by the marginal valuations
of its owners. For example, a firm that produces a vector of future outputs y has market
value
v =
∇ui (xi) · y
‖∇ui (xi)‖
where xi is the shareholder’s consumption bundle and ∇ui (xi) is the vector of marginal
utilities. Our assumption of complete markets for debt and equity implies the existence of
equilibrium prices for all possible securities, even those that are not traded in equilibrium.
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A similar approach is found in Makowski (1983) and Allen and Gale (1988, 1991). An
alternative to the complete markets approach is to assume that only traded securities are
priced, but that firms have rational conjectures about the value a security would have if a
small amount of it were introduced. This approach was used by Hart (1979), for example,
and appears to give the same results as the complete markets approach under suffi ciently
strong regularity conditions.
The existence of intermediaries and the costs of default make the pricing of assets more
complicated in our model than in a stock market economy. Because a firm’s debt is held by
banks and default can occur at the firm level, the bank level, or both, the value of a firm’s
debt will depend on banks’willingness to pay for it, which in turn depends on the banks’
capital structure and the consumers’willingness to pay for the debt and equity of banks.
Bisin, Clementi and Gottardi (2017) also study the pricing of securities when intermediaries
are present.
2 A general equilibrium model of capital structure
There are two dates, indexed t = 0, 1, and a finite number of states of nature, indexed
s = 1, ..., S. The true state is unknown at date 0 and revealed at date 1. The probability
of state s at date 0 is denoted by πs > 0, for s = 1, ..., S, and is assumed to be common
knowledge.
There are two goods, a capital good and a consumption good. There is a fixed endowment
of the capital good at date 0, which is used as the sole input to produce the consumption
good at date 1.
2.1 Producers
We assume there is a large mass of producers who use the capital good to produce the
consumption good. Producers can choose from a finite number of technologies, indexed
j = 1, ..., n, for producing the consumption good. Using technology j, one unit of capital
at date 0 produces Ajs > 0 units of consumption at date 1 in state s. We assume that
each producer can use at most one of the n technologies. Because production is subject to
constant returns to scale, we can focus without loss of generality on the case where each firm
uses one unit of capital. The amount of capital invested in each technology is then equal to
the number of firms using that technology.
In this environment, a firm’s capital structure is determined by the face value of the debt
it issues. The face value of the debt is denoted by ` and belongs to a large but finite set
L ≡ {0, `1, ..., `max}, where 0 ≤ `1 < . . . < `max. Without loss of generality, we can assume
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that `max ≤ max {Ajs} because there is no advantage in issuing debt with a face value that
can never be paid.
Because productivity shocks are the only source of uncertainty, the technology choices
made by firms determine the level of risk in the economy, while their capital structure choices
determine how this risk is distributed between debt and equity.
Firms are identical ex ante but they may differ in their choice of technology and capital
structure. A firm’s choice of face value of debt ` and technology j is referred to as the firm’s
type. The set of firm types is denoted by F ≡ L × N , with generic element (`, j), where
N = {1, ..., n} denotes the set of available technologies.
A firm of type f = (`, j) ∈ F issues debt and equity. The payoff vectors of these assets,
denoted, respectively, by adf ∈ RS+ and aef ∈ RS+, are uniquely determined by the firm’s type
f = (`, j) as follows:
adfs =
{
` if Ajs ≥ `





Ajs − `j if Ajs ≥ `
0 if Ajs < `
(2)
for any state s. The parameter 0 ≤ λf < 1 is the firm’s recovery ratio in the event of default.
In other words, the default costs are 1 − λf per unit of output. For generality, we allow
the recovery ratio to depend on the firm’s type f , but this is not necessary and, in most
applications, λf is independent of f .
Firms choose their technology and capital structure to maximize their profits, which
is equivalent to maximizing the firm’s market value. Since firms are subject to constant
returns to scale, profits must be zero in equilibrium. In other words, the market value of the
securities issued by a firm is just enough to finance the purchase of capital goods. Types of
firms that cannot earn a zero profit will not operate in equilibrium.
Securities issued by firms are sold on competitive markets. In line with our completeness
assumption, there is a price at which the securities issued by each type of firm are traded.






∈ RF+ ×RF+, where qdF is the subvector of
debt prices and qeF is the subvector of equity prices. The market value of a firm of type
f then is qdf + q
e
f . We normalize the price of capital goods to be equal to one. Hence, in
equilibrium, we have qdf + q
e
f ≤ 1 for any f ∈ F– otherwise the demand for capital goods
would be unbounded– and only the firm-types that achieve zero profits, qdf + q
e




There is a large mass of bankers. Each banker can set up a single bank to lend to pro-
ducers. For simplicity, we assume banks do not purchase the firms’equity1. Bankers have
no resources of their own and issue equity and deposits in order to finance their lending to
producers.
A bank’s capital structure is determined by the level of deposits it chooses to issue.
The face value of deposits is denoted by d and is assumed to belong to a finite set D ≡
{0, d1, ..., dmax}. The bank’s portfolio is described by a vector x = {xf}f∈F , where xf is the
number of loans made to firms of type f . Because the banks’technology is subject to constant
returns to scale, we can, without loss of generality, focus on the case where each bank makes
one unit of loans, that is.2
∑
f∈F xf = 1. In other words, the bank invests in loans to firms
that corresponds to the funding of one unit of capital goods3. As a consequence, a typical
loan to a firm will be syndicated among several banks and each bank will hold a non-negative
fraction of the loan. Let X ⊂ RF+ denote the set of admissible bank portfolios, also finite.
Each banker has access to the debt of all types of firms and has the same funding oppor-
tunities. Portfolios and capital structures may differ across banks, however. We refer to a
bank’s portfolio x and capital structure d as its type. The set of bank types is B = X ×D.
Let xb denote the portfolio of a bank of type b. The payoff vectors of the deposits and equity














xb · adFs − d if xb · adFs ≥ d
0 if xb · adFs < d,
(4)






1There are differences between firms’debt and equity that might explain why banks do not invest in
equity, or not as much as in debt: equity does not have a finite maturity, does not pay regular interest,
and has a fluctuating value. Our two period model, based on a competitive equilibrium approach, where
the set of existing markets is exogenously given, is not well suited for studying this and hence to provide
microfoundations for our assumption. This assumption is standard in the banking literature, and makes it
easier to compare our model to this literature.
2Given this property, the upper bound on the face value of banks’debt follows - also w.l.o.g. - from the
one on firms’debt.
3The value of a loan will never be greater than the maximal face value of firm debt and we can set
dmax = `max without loss of generality.
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for each s. The recovery rate 0 ≤ λb ≤ 1 is a constant and may or not depend on the bank’s
type b ∈ B.
The problem of each bank is to select its portfolio and its capital structure to maximize
its profits, given by the difference between its market value, that is the value of the liabilities
it issued, and the value of the portfolio it acquired. The bank takes as given the price of
all debt claims issued by firms, qdF ∈ RF+, as well as the prices of all types of securities the






∈ RB+×RB+, where qdB is the subvector of deposit prices and
qeB is the subvector of equity prices. More formally, each bank will choose its type b ∈ B
to maximize market value minus the cost of the assets it acquired, qdb + q
e
b − qdF · xb. In
equilibrium, the maximum profit will be zero, that is, qdb + q
e
b ≤ qdF ·xb, and only banks that




F · x, will be active.
2.3 Consumers
There is a unit mass of identical consumers. Each consumer has an initial endowment of one
unit of capital at date 0 and no initial endowment of the consumption good. All consumption
takes place at date 1, when the output of consumption good is realized. Consumers have
VNM preferences over consumption described by∑
s
πsu (c1s + βc2s) , (5)
where c1s denotes the consumption in state s that can occur immediately, because it is paid
for with deposits, while c2s denotes the consumption which is paid for with the yields of
equity, and occurs with some delay. The constant 0 < β < 1 captures the cost of this
delay. The specification of the preferences reflects the assumption that deposits serve as
money, whereas equity does not. The delay (or equivalently, transaction) costs involved in
converting equity into “cash” are measured by the parameter β ∈ (0, 1).4 The function
u : R+ → R, describing the utility of total consumption in any state s, c1s+βc2s, is assumed
to be increasing, concave and continuously differentiable.
Each consumer can use the revenue obtained by selling his endowment of capital at
date 0 to purchase the deposits and equity issued by banks and the equity issued by firms.
Consumers cannot purchase firm debt directly, but hold it indirectly by investing in banks
that purchase firm debt.5 The pattern of trades in the economy is summarized in the
following figure:
4The specification is a reduced-form representation of the greater convenience of using deposits for con-
sumption compared to equity. A shareholder who wants to convert shares into consumption must pay a










Figure 1: Trade flows in the economy







denotes the consumer’s demand for debt and equity issued by banks of type






. The set of feasible portfolios is denoted by Z and defined to be
the set of portfolios z such that zdf = 0 for all f ∈ F . Letting q ≡ (qF ,qB), the consumer




πsu (c1s + βc2s)
they can be spent. This time delay reduces the value of the consumption because of discounting.
5This assumption allows us to simplify the analysis which follows, but could be relaxed without affecting
the results. In the environment considered, even if consumers could hold firms’debt, deposits would be more
attractive to them than firms’debt and banks would still have an advantage in lending to firms —because of
their cheap financing via deposits. Hence in equilibrium banks would always hold at least some of the firms’
debt. Under our assumption that the lowest shock hitting any of the firms’technologies is strictly positive,
whatever the level of firms’debt banks can in fact offer safe debt, which earns a liquidity premium, without
incurring any bankruptcy cost. Hence at the margin, starting from zero debt, banks would be willing to pay
more than consumers for firms’debt.
Also, one may argue the assumption is quite realistic. In actual markets, households can hold corporate
debt, but they typically do so by buying corporate bonds, not by lending directly to firms, usually a prerog-
ative of banks who can monitor them. Bonds typically have large denominations and are traded, if at all,
on illiquid markets. They do not serve as money.
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subject to the budget constraints,



















An allocation is described by a consumption bundle, c, and a portfolio, z, of the represen-
tative consumer, a distribution of banks over the set of possible bank types µ = (µb)b∈B,
and a distribution of firm types κ = (κf )f∈F . Thus µb and κf are, respectively, the mass
of bankers and producers who set up a bank of type b and a firm of type f Formally, the
allocation is an array (c, z,µ,κ). An allocation is attainable if∑
f∈F
κf = 1, (6)
∑
b∈B
µbxb = κ, (7)
zdb = z
e
b = µb, ∀b ∈ B, (8)
zef = κf , ∀f ∈ F, (9)
and


















The first attainability condition (6) says that the firms collectively use the entire one unit
of the capital good in the consumers’endowments6. The second condition, (7), says that
banks hold in their portfolio all the debt issued by firms. The third and fourth conditions,
(8) and (9), say that consumers hold all the deposits and equity issued by banks and all the
equity issued by firms. Finally, the last condition, (10), restates the relationship between
consumption and the payoff of the portfolio held by consumers.
An equilibrium consists of an attainable allocation (c, z,µ,κ) and a price system q such
that:
(i) κf > 0 only if f solves the firm’s problem, given the prices q;
6Since each firm is assumed to use one unit of capital, the amount of capital used by firms of type f is
also κf .
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(ii) µb > 0 only if b solves the bank’s problem, given the prices q;
(iii) (c, z) solves the consumer’s problem, given the prices q.
Note that equilibrium condition (i) is equivalent to








for any f ∈ F . Similarly, equilibrium condition (ii) is equivalent to





b − qdF · x
}
= 0,
for any b ∈ B. In what follows, we refer to a firm of type f (respectively, bank of type b) as
being active in equilibrium if and only if κ∗f > 0 (respectively, µ
∗
b > 0). Also, prices are such
that markets for the securities of non active firms clear with zero trades.
3 Effi ciency of equilibria
In this section, we show that analogues of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics
hold for the environment described above. Because banks and firms are restricted to us-
ing - non contingent - debt and equity, the appropriate welfare concept is not Pareto ef-
ficiency7, but constrained Pareto effi ciency. We then show that all competitive equilibria8
are constrained effi cient and any constrained effi cient allocation can be decentralized as an
equilibrium.9
We say that an attainable allocation (c∗, z∗,µ∗,κ∗) is constrained Pareto effi cient, or
constrained effi cient, for short, if there does not exist an attainable allocation (c, z,µ,κ)





πsu (c1s + βc2s)
subject to the constraints ∑
b∈B
µb = 1, (11a)
7This restriction is typically binding, when firms’technologies are risky, hence the first best or Pareto
effi cient allocation cannot be attained. Firms and banks face then a trade-off between issuing liquid assets
and costly default.
8In the online appendix we also establish, for completeness, the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
9Since there is a representative consumer, lump sum taxes and transfers are not needed to decentralize














µbxb · aeF . (12a)
To see this, note first that if (c∗,µ∗) satisfies the constraints (11a) and (12a), we can use the
attainability conditions (8) and (9) to define the consumers’portfolio z and use the attain-
ability condition (7) to define κf . Then it is easy to check that (c∗, z∗,µ∗,κ∗) satisfies the
attainability constraints (6)—(10). Conversely, if (c∗, z∗,µ∗,κ∗) is an attainable allocation,
(c∗,µ∗) satisfies the constraints.10
Proposition 1 Let (c∗, z∗,µ∗,κ∗,q∗) be an equilibrium. Then (c∗, z∗,µ∗,κ∗) is constrained
Pareto effi cient.
Also, note that the set of attainable consumption vectors satisfying (11a), (12a) is convex
and this allows us to establish the following:
Proposition 2 Suppose that (c∗, z∗,µ∗,κ∗) is a constrained effi cient allocation. Then there
exists a price vector q∗ such that (c∗, z∗,µ∗,κ∗,q∗) is an equilibrium.
The argument of the proof of the two propositions is standard, and exploits the fact
that in the competitive equilibrium notion, defined in Section 2.4, a market exists for all the
possible types of securities that can be issued by firms and banks. The model considered
provides a benchmark, where the risk composition of the assets and the capital structures
chosen by firms and banks are effi cient and we can then focus on the characterization of
their properties. This benchmark is important, as it demonstrates the effi ciency of firms’
and banks’choices in a decentralized economy. Furthermore, it considerably simplifies the
analysis of equilibrium allocations. For the validity of these results we assume away usual
frictions, like asymmetric information, and some of the other conditions needed are also fairly
demanding, as we discuss in what follows. As discussed in Section 5, our analysis provides
useful objectives for regulatory interventions when such frictions are present.
First, implicit in the modeling of markets, is the assumption that agents know what
securities they are trading. When a consumer makes a deposit in a bank, he knows the
bank’s capital structure and portfolio and that the bank is committed to these choices.
Similarly, when a bank lends to a firm, it knows the firm’s capital structure and portfolio
and that the firm is committed to these choices. This assumption rules out risk shifting and
other forms of moral hazard.
10To show this, we simply need to use the attainability conditions (7), (8), and (9) to eliminate z∗ and
κ∗ from (10), getting constraint (12a) as a result. Similarly, the attainability conditions (6) and (7) imply
constraint (11a).
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Second, as Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) have shown, competitive equilibrium
is constrained ineffi cient for generic economies with uncertainty if they satisfy certain condi-
tions regarding the number of consumption goods and/or of trading dates. In our framework,
we assume there are only two dates and a single good at each date, so these conditions
are not satisfied. The assumptions of a single good and two periods are common in finan-
cial applications, but they are restrictive. The representative consumer assumption is not
crucial– as long as there is a single good, we could extend the theory to allow for multiple
types of consumers.
Finally, as mentioned, we require the existence of markets (and market-clearing prices)
for all possible types of debt and equity, not just the types traded in equilibrium. As we
have already explained, firms and banks are creating new securities when they choose their
capital structures and technologies (in the case of firms) or portfolios (in the case of banks).
There is no limit on the number of possible securities, which could in principle be very large.
Since only a small subset of securities are actively traded in equilibrium, the prices in
the inactive markets should be viewed as traders’expectations over the price at which newly
issued securities would trade. It may be helpful to think about this assumption in terms
of an analogy with the familiar idea of Arrow securities and their role in economizing on
the number markets required to implement an effi cient allocation. Instead of trading all
contingent commodities at an initial date, agents trade Arrow securities at the initial date
in order to reallocate their wealth across the uncertain states of nature. Then they trade
commodities on spot markets, after the state of nature has been revealed. This two-step
procedure reduces the number of markets in operation from S × L to S + L, where S is the
number of states and L the number of physical commodities. But in order to economize
on markets in this way, it is necessary for agents to anticipate the correct market-clearing
prices in all the possible spot markets, those markets never open because the corresponding
state does not occur, as well as the spots markets on which trade occurs. In the same way,
the banks and firms in our model anticipate market-clearing prices for all securities markets,
even those that are inactive.
4 Equilibrium capital structures
In this section we examine the interaction between the capital structure chosen by firms
and the one chosen by banks. The use of equity is expensive because it reduces the portion
of the cash flow that is paid out as liquid deposits. At the same time, banks and firms
have incentives to include equity in their capital structures because equity provides a buffer
against costly default. To some extent, firm equity and bank equity are substitutes, but
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a firm’s equity does “double duty”because it makes the firm’s debt less risky and that in
turn reduces the riskiness of the bank’s assets. If a firm has very low leverage, its debt will
be relatively safe. If a bank lends only to firms with low leverage, the bank’s assets will be
relatively safe and the need for an equity buffer will be diminished. This suggests that it may
be effi cient for banks to have higher leverage (lower equity buffers) than firms. At the same
time, we will also see that bank equity provides a more effective buffer against idiosyncratic
shocks.
The capital structure is not the only factor affecting the risk of default. The firms’choice
of a technology also contributes to the level of aggregate risk in the economy and to the
probability of default for individual firms and banks. Similarly, the banks’portfolio choices
and the possibility of diversification may reduce the banks’probability of default.
Our analysis will show the comparative advantages of bank equity and firm equity. A
general characterization of the equilibrium capital structures in the environment described
is diffi cult because of the non-convexities introduced by the use of debt and the deadweight
costs of default. We begin in the next subsection by considering a single factor model and
showing conditions under which bank equity must be positive.
4.1 A “single factor”model
To explain the benefits of bank equity, based on its role in providing a buffer against idiosyn-
cratic shocks, we present first the argument in the set-up of a "single factor" model. This has
the advantage that the argument is simpler and the model is closer to the ones considered
in the banking literature.
In the banking literature, single factor models, such as the one due to Vasicek (2002), are
widely used to represent loss distributions of bank portfolios. This model considers a single
bank that lends to an infinite number of firms indexed by j. Each borrowing firm j has the
same marginal distribution of returns. The value of the assets Aj (T ) of firm j at time T are
assumed to be the product of two random variables,





where z is a standard normal aggregate shock, εj is a standard normal idiosyncratic shock
to firm j, and ρ is the correlation parameter of the random variables {εj}. Firm j defaults
at time T if Bj > Aj (T ), where Bj is the face value of the loan given by the bank.
The single factor model differs from the general equilibrium model presented in the pre-
vious section in several ways. The returns Aj (T ) are exogenous and have identical marginal
distributions. The bank is perfectly diversified, that is, it lends the same amount to each
firm j, and chooses its capital structure to maximize its value assuming risk neutrality.
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Something similar to the specification in (13), when ρ ∈ (0, 1),11 can be obtained in the
environment described in the previous section, if we assume that there is a large number of
technologies j ∈ [0, 1]. The productivity of technology j (per unit of capital) is given by
Aj = θja, where θj and a are random variables, with {θj} i.i.d. and independent of a. Let
θ and a be distributed according to the c.d.f.s F (θ) and G (a), respectively, where F and
G are C1, both have support [0,∞), and the respective probability density functions f (θ)
and g (a) are strictly positive for θ > 0 and a > 0. Furthermore, it is assumed that each
technology is operated in the same proportion by firms and all firms have the same face
value of the debt ` ≥ 0. Also, all banks hold a perfectly diversified and symmetric portfolio
containing an equal amount of the debt issued by firms using each technology.
This single factor model differs from the general equilibrium model presented in the pre-
vious section because the main focus is on the capital structure decision of the representative
bank, set to maximize its value when the representative consumer is risk neutral. Hence it
abstracts from the decisions by firms and banks concerning the composition of their assets
and from the possibility that firms may vary their debt level according to the technology
chosen.12 In this case, the return to a fully diversified portfolio depends only on the aggregate




λfθaf (θ) dθ + (1− F (`/a)) `,
for any value of a. Under the assumptions about the distributions of a and θ, ` (a) is
increasing in a. In fact,















λfθf (θ) dθ > 0.
The return to bank deposits, with face value d̄, when the aggregate shock is a, is denoted
by d (a) and defined by
d (a) =
{
d̄ if d̄ ≤ ` (a)
λb` (a) if d̄ > ` (a) .
11The two extreme cases, where returns are purely idiosyncratic, ρ = 0, or perfectly correlated, ρ = 1, are
ignored here as they are not very interesting situations for the choice of the banks’capital structure. In both
situations, as explained in the next sections 4.2 and 4.3, banks do not need to hold any capital.
12The properties we postulated for these decisions appear natural in the environment we described, because
the technologies are ex ante identical and subject to some shocks that are perfectly diverfiable. In a later
section, we demonstrate, for a simpler but analogous version of the technology shocks, that all these properties
arise endogenously in equilibrium.
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The return to bank equity is max
{
` (a)− d̄, 0
}
, while the return to firm equity, if the ag-
gregate shock is a, is ∫ ∞
`/a
(θa− `) f (θ) dθ.
An effi cient choice of ` and d̄ must maximize the representative agent’s utility, assumed
risk neutral. This can be expressed in terms of the payoffs of deposits and bank and firm
equity specified above:∫ ∞
0
{
d (a) + βmax
{





(θa− `) f (θ) dθ
}
g (a) da. (14)
Since the yield of firms’debt is less or equal than its face value ` and default is costly, we
must have d̄ ≤ ` in equilibrium. The expected returns to bank equity will be positive if and
only if d̄ < ` (a) for a set of values of a with positive probability. But this must always be
true if d̄ < `. To see this, note that if ` > 0, we have ` (a) < ` for any finite value of a and
` (a) → ` as a → ∞. Since ` (a) is continuous, if d̄ < ` there is a positive probability that
d̄ < ` (a) and the value of the bank’s equity is positive.
Proposition 3 In the single factor model, under the maintained assumptions, banks choose
a positive value of equity: the values ̂̄d and ˆ̀ that maximize (14) must satisfy ̂̄d < ˆ̀.
Why does the effi cient bank capital structure have a positive value of equity in the single
factor model? In this environment, increasing the value of bank equity above zero reduces
the bankruptcy costs of banks, by an amount (1− λb) ` (a) , by avoiding default for high





, due to the decrease in the payout to depositors. We show in the proof
that, provided bank equity is not too large, the first effect always prevails over the second.
The result crucially depends on the existence of the idiosyncratic shock θ, which ensures
that the return ` (a) on the bank’s portfolio of loans is always strictly increasing in a. If θ
were a degenerate random variable, for example, θ = 1 with probability one, this property
is no longer valid. In fact, ` (a) would be constant for suffi ciently large values of a, and the
constrained effi cient value of equity would be zero. This result is shown formally in the next
section, for the general equilibrium model described in Section 2.
4.2 Co-monotonic technologies
In this section, we analyze the properties of the equilibria, where each firm chooses a tech-
nology and its leverage, and each bank its loan portfolios and leverage, under the assumption
that the n available technologies are co-monotonic.
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Definition 4 Technologies are said to be co-monotonic if Ajs−1 < Ajs, for every s = 2, ..., S
and j = 1, ..., n.
This condition requires that the productivities of all technologies are increasing functions of
the state s. In other words, the productivity shocks are driven by a single factor and there
is no idiosyncratic component. As a consequence, an increase in s reduces defaults for all
types of firms and banks. If the co-monotonicity property is satisfied and the sets L and D
are suffi ciently rich in a sense we make precise in the proof, we obtain the following result,
which generalizes the one by ACM:13
Proposition 5 Assume that technologies are co-monotonic. Then if (c∗, z∗, µ∗, κ∗, q∗) is an
equilibrium, the value of bank equity is zero for all active bank types b ∈ B.
Thus, in equilibrium, banks default if any of their borrowers default. Each bank is on a
knife edge, with no capacity to absorb losses. The result shows that the “double duty”role
of firm equity prevails here. In any configuration where banks have positive equity, there
must be a state where banks are solvent but hold in their portfolio the debt of a defaulting
firm. In that case, an improvement can be achieved by decreasing the face value of the debt
of such firm and increasing its equity, so that the firm becomes solvent in this state. Doing
so reduces the firm’s default costs and hence increases the total payment to equityholders,
without affecting payouts to depositors.
The co-monotonicity assumption is stated as a property of the productivity of all the
technologies available in the economy. It is easy to see from the proof of Proposition 5 that
this result is valid as long as the bank lends only to firms with co-monotonic technologies.
For any bank portfolio x, let the set of technologies represented in the portfolio be denoted
by J (x) and defined by
J (x) =
{
j = 1, ..., n : x(`,j) > 0 for some `
}
.
Then we say that the portfolio x is co-monotonic if the set of technologies J (x) is co-
monotonic in the usual sense. The following corollary is then immediate.
Corollary 6 In any equilibrium (c∗, z∗, µ∗, κ∗, q∗), the value of equity is zero for any active
bank b∗ whose portfolio x∗ is co-monotonic.
13ACM make a number of other restrictive assumptions not required in our framework: consumers are risk
neutral and exogenously divided into depositors and shareholders; there is a single technology with uniformly
distributed productivity; the capital structure of banks and firms is chosen to maximize total surplus.
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ACM establish an analogous result when a single technology is available to firms, a
special case of co-monotonicity, under some assumptions recalled in the Introduction. They
also extend the result to an environment with two technologies with i.i.d. productivities.
The reason is that under appropriate conditions, because of the non-convexities generated by
the possibility of costly default, it is optimal for banks not to diversify their portfolio and to
lend only to firms that use the same technology (in other words, banks choose co-monotonic
portfolios as in Corollary 6). We will show in the next section that this last property is not
robust and, with enough independent technologies, banks choose to diversify their portfolio;
when not all risk can be diversified away —as in the single factor model —we have then
positive bank equity.
4.3 Positive bank equity
The results in the previous section show that the presence of an idiosyncratic component in
the technology shocks is necessary for bank equity to have positive value, but is it suffi cient
outside the assumptions of the single factor model? To answer this question, in this section we
study a simple specification of the technology shocks, with both aggregate and idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, for which we can derive the equilibrium allocation and capital structures
explicitly. We can then identify conditions under which competitive equilibria exhibit a
positive value of bank equity.
We assume there are n technologies and a finite number S = n + 2 of states of nature.





for 1 ≤ s ≤ n
δ for s = n+ 1
ε for s = n+ 2
. (15)
The productivity of technology j ∈ {1, .., n} in state s is assumed to satisfy
Ajs =

aL if s = j ≤ n
aM if s 6= j ≤ n
aM if s = n+ 1
aH if s = n+ 2
, (16)
where 0 < aL < aM < aH .
This specification features both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. It has been chosen
so as to capture the different effects that these two components of the uncertainty have on
firms’and banks’choices, while keeping the characterization of equilibria still tractable. The
idiosyncratic shocks affect the technologies in states s = 1, .., n, in the sense that one and a
20
different technology in each of these states features a drop in its productivity to aL, but the
average productivity across technologies is constant in each of these states. In contrast, in
states n+ 1 and n+ 2 respectively a small and big positive shock affect the productivity of
all the technologies.(In the Appendix we discuss more in detail how this specification relates
to the single factor model of Section 4.1.) Varying the parameters ε, δ, the relative weight
of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty varies, in different ways, and we can then analyze
the effect on firm and bank choices.
We will also assume here that consumers are risk neutral, which allows us to simplify the
characterization of equilibrium prices and quantities. Under this assumption, an attainable
allocation (c∗, z∗,µ∗,κ∗) is constrained effi cient if and only if any type of bank b∗ in the
















b∗ · aeF )
)
.
In other words, if we think of an active bank and the firms that borrow from it as a conglom-
erate, the market value of this conglomerate must equal the expected value of consumption
for the representative consumer. If this condition were not satisfied, either the bank or the
firms or both would not be maximizing their market values. We use this property repeatedly
in what follows.
A bank portfolio is said to be simple if all firms whose debt is held by the bank have the
same capital structure, as long as they have the same technology, or the same probability
distribution of their productivity. We can show that it is optimal for banks to choose a
simple portfolio when the structure of technologies satisfies (15) and (16), thus providing
some justification for the conditions used in the analysis of the single factor model. Since
the technologies are ex ante identical, it follows that the same capital structure is optimal
for all firms.
Proposition 7 Suppose the technologies satisfy (15) and (16). Then, in equilibrium, every
bank chooses a simple portfolio, that is, one containing either (i) only the debt of firms with
no default risk (`j = aL), or (ii) only the debt of firms with low default risk (`j = aM), or
(iii) only the debt of firms with high default risk (`j = aH).
Given the technology structure, there are three possible candidates for the face value of
the firm’s debt. The firm can choose the face value equal to aL, so that it never defaults,
or aM , so that the firm only defaults when hit by a negative shock, or aH , so that the firm
defaults unless it is hit by a large positive shock. Proposition 7 assures us that a bank will
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lend to firms that use only one of these capital structures.14
The specification given by (15) and (16) incorporates a number of interesting cases. In the
limit as δ + ε→ 1, that is, when only states n+ 1 and n+ 2 have positive probability, there
is only aggregate risk and all technologies are identical and, hence, co-monotonic. Then
Proposition 5 implies that the value of bank equity will be zero in any equilibrium when
δ + ε = 1. At the other extreme, in the limit as δ → 0 and ε→ 0, only the states s = 1, .., n
can occur and in each of them, exactly one technology yields aL and the remainder yield aM .
We have so the case of pure idiosyncratic risk. In this case too, we show that bank equity
has zero value, but for rather different reasons than in the co-monotonic case. The following
proposition characterizes the equilibrium allocations in such a situation. These allocations
are, of course, constrained effi cient by Proposition 1.
Proposition 8 Assume the technologies satisfy (15), (16) and δ = ε = 0. Then in equilib-







aL > aM , each bank lends exclusively to firms with safe debt (`j = aL),







aL < aM , each bank lends exclusively to firms with risky debt (`j = aM)
and chooses a fully diversified portfolio (holding a fraction 1/n of debt of firms choosing tech-








In either case bank equity has zero value.
The proposition shows that when δ = ε = 0, there are two possible equilibrium allocations,
distinguished by the face value of firms’debt and by whether or not firms default. In each
equilibrium allocation, banks’portfolios are risk free. Note that a risk free portfolio should
always be entirely funded with deposits because equity is costly (β < 1) and there is no
need for an equity buffer in absence of default risk. Moreover, firms choose higher leverage,
so that they default if hit by a negative shock, when the size of the negative idiosyncratic
shock, aM − aL, is suffi ciently large, and/or the liquidity (1−β) or the default costs (1−λf)
are suffi ciently small.
In both of the extreme cases in the environment considered in this section, that is, when
δ = ε = 0 and δ + ε = 1, it is optimal to have zero bank equity. In between the two
extremes, when there is both aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risk, there is a role for equity
14Unfortunately, there is no intuitive explanation for this result. The proof proceeds by considering all
possible portfolios and showing that non-simple portfolios are always dominated.
15The choice technology is immaterial since safe debt pays aL with probability one.
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in the effi cient capital structures of both firms and banks. The following result establishes
this more precisely.





n− 1 − β
)
aL < aM ,
there exist δ∗ > 0 and ε∗ > 0 such that, for any 0 < δ < δ∗ and 0 ≤ ε < ε∗, in any
equilibrium, each bank chooses a fully diversified portfolio (consisting of equal amounts of









and bank equity has positive value.
In the situation described, banks receive a loan repayment equal to aM > d in state s = n+1,
n + 2. Hence the value of bank equity is positive. The same is true also for firm equity if
ε > 0, because the shareholders of the representative firm receive aH − aM > 0 in state
s = n+ 2.
The first condition required for the claim in Proposition 9 is the one derived in case (ii)
of Proposition 8 under which, when δ = ε = 0, firms choose a high debt level ` = aM and
banks choose a fully diversified portfolio in equilibrium. The second condition is that δ and
ε are both positive, but not too large. That is, we are suffi ciently close to the case of purely
idiosyncratic uncertainty so that firms’and banks’debt level and banks’portfolio are the
same as when δ = ε = 0.
To gain some understanding of why banks choose a positive level of equity under the
conditions of Proposition 9, note that firms choose a risky face value of debt, `j = aM , so a
firm choosing technology j defaults in state s = j. To avoid default in all states, the firm
would have to reduce its debt level `j from aM to aL. Given the relatively small likelihood of
state s = j, the cost would outweigh the benefits. The opposite is true if we assess costs and
benefits of an equity buffer to prevent the default of a diversified bank. First, the probability
that some firm whose debt is held by the bank defaults is n times higher than the probability
that any given firm defaults. A shock that is unlikely to affect a particular firm is so quite
likely to affect a diversified bank. Second, the required equity buffer is much smaller than
in the firm’s case, because the debt of the defaulting firm is a small fraction of the bank’s
portfolio. We begin so to see why banks choose to hold a capital buffer against a shock while
firms do not.
23
The first three lines in the table below summarize the equilibrium values of bank and
firm equity in the different cases characterized by Propositions 8 and 9:16
Parameters Value of bank equity Value of firm equity
ε+ δ = 1 = 0 ??
ε+ δ = 0 = 0 = 0
0 ≤ δ < δ∗, 0 < ε < ε∗ > 0 > 0
δ∗∗ < δ < 1, ε = 0 = 0 = 0
Note that whether firm equity has positive or zero value in the case where the only aggregate
risk and technologies are co-monotonic (ε+ δ = 1) depends on parameter values. There are
two possible equilibrium outcomes: in one `j = aM and the value of firm equity is positive,
in the other, `j = aH and the value of firm equity is zero.
The technologies defined by (15) and (16) also allow us to explore the connection between
portfolio diversification and the presence of positive bank equity. We noted at the end of
Section 4.2 that bank equity cannot have positive value unless banks diversify their portfolios.
In other words, bank equity has no role as a buffer unless the bank faces risks that can be
partly diversified. At the same time, one can have diversification without a positive value of
bank equity, as we saw in case (ii) of Proposition 8, where bank equity has zero value and
the fully diversified bank’s portfolio is risk free. But there are other situations (described
in the last line of the table above) where there is a risk of default that could be reduced by
diversification, yet banks choose not to diversify and to issue no equity, accepting a positive
probability of default.
Proposition 10 Assume that firms’technologies satisfy (15), (16) and ε = 0. Then there
exists δ∗∗ > 0 such that, for all δ∗∗ < δ < 1, any equilibrium has the following properties:
each bank lends to firms using a single technology j and issuing debt with low default risk
(`j = aM), and bank deposits are d = aM . Both these firms and the banks lending to them
default in state s = j.
The proof follows an argument parallel to the proof of Proposition 9. In the limit, when
δ = 1, there is no risk and banks and firms choose d = ` = aM . For δ < 1 suffi ciently close
to 1, the upper hemicontinuity of the constrained effi cient allocation correspondence implies
that Proposition 10 holds. To avoid banks’default, even with diversification, an equity buffer
is needed, as we saw in Proposition 9, that is bounded away from zero. As δ → 1, the cost
of the buffer remains bounded away from zero while the benefit converges to zero. When
the bank chooses d = aM , on the other hand, the value of diversification is negative: the





aL < aM is maintained here.
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probability of default is minimized by choosing a portfolio made of loans to firms using the
same technology j and the benefit of this choice increases as δ → 1.
Thus, even if diversification is possible, it is not always optimal. Evidently, the gains
from diversification have to be “suffi ciently large”before they provide a motive for banks to
issue a positive value of equity. In other words, a violation of co-monotonicity is necessary,
but not suffi cient, as we saw in Proposition 10, for bank equity to have positive value. This
principle is also illustrated by ACM, who analyse an environment with two i.i.d. technologies
and show that, for some parameter values, it is optimal for banks to lend only to firms using
one of the technologies, that is, to choose a co-monotonic portfolio. In that case, it will
be optimal for bank equity to have zero value, even though there appears to be scope for
diversification.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a competitive equilibrium model in which banks act as intermediaries
between consumers and productive firms that choose which risky technology to operate.
Banks and firms raise funds by issuing debt and equity. The Modigliani Miller Theorem does
not hold in this environment for two reasons. First, bank deposits offer liquidity services.
Second, the use of debt can lead to costly bankruptcy. As a result, the optimal capital
structure, for a firm or a bank, is determinate in equilibrium. Firms’ equity serves as a
buffer against the default risk both of firms and of banks lending to them, while banks’
equity, together with the diversification of their portfolio, is only a buffer against banks’
default risk. Hence there is some trade-off between allocating capital buffers to firms rather
than banks and to determine the level of bank equity the entire supply chain of financing
must be taken into account.
In this context, we have established analogues of the fundamental theorems of welfare
economics, showing that equilibria are constrained effi cient and that constrained effi cient
allocations are decentralizable. Thus, equilibrium capital structures are privately and socially
optimal: they maximize the market value of the firm or bank and they are consistent with
constrained effi ciency. The importance of the general equilibrium theory is that it shows how
markets coordinate the choice of capital structures, in the corporate and banking sectors,
together with the firms’choice of technology risk, so that risk and equity capital are optimally
allocated between the two sectors.
We have shown that the equilibrium value of bank equity depends on the risk structure of
the economy. In particular, bank equity is zero when there is only aggregate risk. In contrast,
bank equity is positive when there is both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk and suffi cient scope
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for diversification so that most —though not all —of the risk can be eliminated in banks.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the study of an environment in which the laissez-
faire equilibrium is constrained effi cient provides a benchmark, and a useful starting point for
a theory of bank capital regulation. In the first place, the characterization of the constrained
effi cient capital structures gives us some idea of which kind of allocations capital adequacy
regulation should aim to achieve when equilibria fail to be effi cient. In the second place,
the contrast between the ideal conditions under which laissez-faire equilibria are constrained
effi cient and the ones present in the real world may allow us to gain some understanding of
why market failures occur and also to assess their welfare costs.
We also alluded briefly to some of the frictions which may justify capital regulation.
Asymmetric information is one. Banks are opaque and depositors and equity holders alike
may have incomplete information about the risk characteristics of the bank’s portfolio.
Asymmetric information may give rise to moral hazard in the form of risk shifting and
asset substitution. Furthermore, the possibility of government bailouts in the event of de-
fault may encourage excessive risk taking. Externalities, whether pecuniary or real, may
give rise to costs that are not internalized by bankers.
Capital requirements may not be a panacea, however. Managers’interests are not aligned
with shareholders’interests and, even if they are aligned, it is not clear that the top manage-
ment of the largest banks is aware of and able to control risk taking by highly incentivized
managers at lower levels. The financial crisis provided us with several examples of high level
managers, holding large equity stakes in the bank, who were unaware of the dangers facing
their banks until the last minute.
We have also ignored a second motive for requiring a large capital buffer: bank capital
is part of total loss absorption capacity (TLAC), which reduces the need for politically
unpopular bailouts. Whether innovations such as TLAC and bail-inable debt will actually
put an end to bailouts is not clear, but capital regulation motivated by the desire to avoid
bailouts may look quite different from capital regulation motivated by moral hazard in risk
taking.
So, there is much to be done in order to develop a satisfactory microfoundation for
capital regulation. But the recognition that effi cient capital structures in the banking and
corporate sectors are interrelated and determined by general equilibrium forces is a first-order
requirement for any sensible theory.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that (c∗, z∗,µ∗,κ∗)
is constrained ineffi cient. Then there exists a feasible allocation (c, z,µ,κ) such that U (c) >
U (c∗). Condition (iii) of the definition of equilibrium implies that c lies outside the repre-
sentative consumer’s budget set. That is, q∗ · z > 1, where












and H = B ∪ F is the combined set of types of banks and firms. Now the equilibrium
optimality condition for banks implies that
qd∗b + q
e∗
b ≤ qd∗F · xb,






























because attainability requires that zdb = z
e
b = µb, for any b = (x, d) ∈ B, and
∑
b∈B µbxf = κf ,
for any f ∈ F .




for any f ∈ F . But this implies that





















This contradicts our initial hypothesis and proves that the equilibrium allocation must be
effi cient.
31
Proof of Proposition 2
Let C denote the set of attainable consumption vectors. Then the supporting hyperplane
theorem tells us that there exists a non-negative price vector p∗ such that
p∗ · c∗ = sup {p∗ · c : c ∈ C} .
Without loss of generality, we normalize prices so that p∗ · c∗ = 1. Now define the securities’















qd∗f = 1− qe∗f .
For any (c,µ,κ) satisfying (11a) and (12a),
1 = p∗ · c∗












































µbxb · qd∗F .
It follows from this inequality that, for any bank b, with portfolio x,
qd∗b + q
e∗
b + x · qd∗F ≤ 1,
=⇒ qd∗b + qe∗b + x · (1− qe∗F ) ≤ 1,
=⇒ qd∗b + qe∗b − x · qe∗F ≤ 0.
In other words, no bank can earn positive profits. But active firms must earn zero profits in
equilibrium, because


































































b − x · qd∗F = 0.




so all firms are value maximizing.
Finally, the optimality of the representative consumer’s choice follows from the fact that
U (c) > U (c∗) implies that p∗ · c > p∗ · c∗. Any portfolio z that generates a consumption
bundle c must therefore have a value greater than 1 because we have defined security prices
so that
q · z = p · c.
But this implies that z does not belong to the budget set {z : q · z ≤ 1}.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that ̂̄d ≥ ˆ̀.
Then the bank will be bankrupt with probability one and d (a) = λb` (a) for all a. Hence
the representative agent’s utility is∫ ∞
0
{
d (a) + β
∫ ∞
`/a
(θa− `) f (θ) dθ
}
g (a) da =∫ ∞
0
{
λb` (a) + β
∫ ∞
`/a
(θa− `) f (θ) dθ
}
g (a) da.
Consider the effect of reducing the face value of deposits so that d̄ satisfies
(1− β) `
2− β − λb
< d̄ < `, (17)
while holding ` constant at ˆ̀. Note that there exists a non-empty set of such values of d̄
because
(1− β) `
2− β − λb
=
(1− β) `
1− β + 1− λb
< `.
Then, for large values of a, we avoid the bankruptcy costs imposed on the banks. Let ā
be the smallest value of a for which the banks are solvent: ` (ā) = d̄. Then the gain from







+ d̄− λb` (a)
}












which must be positive because the inequality (17) implies that the integrand of the right









+ (1− λb) d̄
= (β − 1) `+ (2− β − λb) d̄
> (β − 1) `+ (1− β) ` = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Let (c∗, z∗,µ∗,κ∗) be an equilibrium and let (d,xb) = b ∈ B be a fixed but arbitrary type of
bank such that µ∗b > 0. For any firm-type f = (`, j) ∈ F such that xbf > 0, recall that the
loan repayment in state s is,
adfs =
{
` if ` ≤ Ajs
λfAjs if ` > Ajs












for each state s. The equity of a bank of type b pays outmax {`bs − d, 0} units of consumption
to shareholders in any state s and the holders of deposits receive
dbs =
{
d if d ≤ `bs
λb`bs if d > `bs
for any state s.
In order to prove the proposition, we need to assume that the setsD and L are suffi ciently
rich.
Definition 11 The sets D and L are suffi ciently rich in the following sense: for any (j, s),
Ajs ∈ L and, for any (b, s), `bs ∈ D.
The first requirement ensures that any producer can choose the face value of his debt to
coincide with the output of his chosen technology in a particular state. The second require-
ment ensures that a banker can choose the amount of deposits to coincide with the revenue
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from a portfolio of loans in a particular state. Note that these quantities are determined by
the respective types of firm and bank.
Step 1: The value of bank b’s equity is positive if and only if `b > d.
The dividends paid by the bank are non-negative in each state because of limited liability.
Then it is clear that the value of equity is strictly positive if and only if `bs > d for at least
one state s. Because default is costly, an active firm f = (`, j) will choose a debt level
`f ≤ AfS and an active bank b = (d,xb) will choose a level of deposits d ≤
∑
f∈F xbf`f . We
claim that the value of bank b’s equity is positive if and only if d < `b. To see this, note first
that, if `b = d, the payment to equity holders (as defined above) is zero in each state and,
second, if `b > d, the payment must be positive in state S at least, because in that state
each firm f with xbf > 0 repays the face value of its debt in full, the bank receives `b, and
the equity holders receive `b − d > 0.
Step 2: For each f such that xbf > 0, there exists a state sf such that firm f is solvent if
and only if s ≥ sf . Similarly, there exists a state sb such that bank b is solvent if and only
if s ≥ sb.
A firm f = (`, j) is insolvent in state s if and only if ` > Ajs. Let sf be the smallest state
such that f is solvent. There must be such a state because the firm is solvent at least in
state S. The fact that Ajs is increasing in s implies that f is solvent if and only if s ≥ sf .
Similarly, we can show that there is a state sb such that bank b is solvent if and only if
s ≥ sb. Let sb denote the smallest state in which the bank is solvent. There must be such a
state because the bank is solvent at least in state S. It is clear that `bs is non-decreasing in s
because Ajs is increasing in s for every j and this implies that `fs and `bs are non-decreasing
in s, for every f . Then it is clear that dbs is non-decreasing in s because `bs is non-decreasing
in s. From this observation it follows that the bank is solvent if and only if s ≥ sb.
Step 3: The face value of deposits satisfies d = `bsb .
To prove this claim, we have to consider two cases. First, suppose that sb = 1, that is bank
b is solvent in every state, and d < `b1.Then increasing d to d′ = `b1, say, will increase the
payout to depositors by in every state and reduce the payout to equity holders by the same
amount. This increases effective consumption by (1− β) (d′ − d) in each state, contradicting
the constrained effi ciency of the equilibrium.
The second possibility is that sb > 1 and d < `bsb . Suppose the bank increases deposits
to d′ = `bsb . This will not have any effect in states s < sb because the bank is in default,
depositors are receiving `bs < d, and bank equity holders are receiving nothing. In states
s ≥ sb, on the other hand, the net effect will be an increase in effective consumption of
(1− β) (d′ − d). This again contradicts constrained effi ciency.
Step 4: Bank b’s equity has no value: d = `b.
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Suppose to the contrary that d = `bsb < `b. Then there must exist at least one firm that is
bankrupt in state sb. Otherwise, the firms’repayment would be `bsb = `b. Suppose that a
firm-type f = (`, j) with xbf > 0 is bankrupt in state sb and consider the effect of reducing
the borrowing of f to `′f = Ajsb . This change has no impact on the viability of the bank
in state sb because firm f is now paying Ajsb in state sb, instead of λfAjsb . So the bank is
solvent in states s ≥ sb as before. Also, the change does have an effect on the solvency of
the firm, as it is now solvent in state sb and hence in all states s ≥ sb.
Note that none of the payoffs to the debt and equity of the bank or the firm change in
states s < sb. Moreover, there are no changes to the payoff to bank deposits in states s ≥ sb
because the bank is solvent in all these states and hence pays d to depositors. The changes
in payoff affect only the returns to equity in the states s ≥ sb. Consider first the bank’s
equity. In states s ≥ sb, the payoff to the bank’s equity will increase because of the increase
in the firm’s repayment. In fact, the change in the payoff of the bank’s equity is
∆b,s =
{
Ajsb − λfAjs if sb ≤ s < sf
Ajsb − `f if sf ≤ s
,
because the firm will pay Ajsb in each state and was previously paying λfAjs in states
sb ≤ s < sf and `f in states sf ≤ s.
The return to the equity of firm f is increased by Ajs−Ajsb for all s ≥ sb, so the change
in the firm’s equity is
∆f,s =
{
Ajs − Ajsb if sb ≤ s < sf
`− Ajsb if sf ≤ s
.
The transfer between bank equity holders and firm equity holders has no effect on total
consumption. The net increase in consumption is the sum of ∆b,s and ∆f,s, that is,
∆b,s + ∆f,s =
{
Afsb − λfAjs + Ajs − Ajsb if sb ≤ s < sf
Ajsb − `f + `f − Ajsb if sf ≤ s
=
{
Ajs − λfAjs if sb ≤ s < sf
0 if sf ≤ s
.
Thus, the net gain for equity holders is the saving in default costs (1− λf )Ajs in the states
sb ≤ s < sf . The possibility of such a gain contradicts the constrained effi ciency of the
equilibrium.
This completes the proof that bank equity has no value.
Technology shocks in (16) and the single factor model
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To compare the specification in (16) with the single factor model, note that we can
represent the productivity of technology j as Ajs = θjA, where A is an aggregate shock and
θj is an idiosyncratic shock, with marginal distributions given by
A =
{
aH w. prob. δ




1 w. prob. δ
1 w. prob. 1− δ − (n− 1) ε/n
aL/aM w. prob. (1− δ − ε) /n
.
In the single factor model of Section 4.1, we assumed that the shock θj was i.i.d. across
technologies and independent of A. In (16) we assume that the idiosyncratic shock θj is
degenerate and equal to one when A = aH , while it takes the values 1 and aL/aM when
A = aM . In addition, we assume the idiosyncratic shocks are negatively correlated across
technologies, in the sense that the realization of θj is equal to aL/aM < 1 for at most one
technology j in any state.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Banks holding risk free debt In the case of a bank holding only the debt of firms




j = 1. The
optimal capital structure for the bank is to issue the maximum amount of deposits, d = aL.
The expected utility generated by the bank and the firms whose debt it holds will be


















= aL + εβ (aH − aL) +
(
δ + (1− δ − ε) n− 1
n
)
β (aM − aL) .
Banks holding safe and risky debt Now suppose that the bank lends to a mixture
of safe and risky firms. We can focus here on the loans made by the bank to firms with
technology j but possibly different capital structures. Suppose that γ units of capital are
invested in safe firms with `j = aL and 1 − γ units of capital are invested in risky or very
risky firms, that is, firms that have a capital structure `j ∈ {aH , aM}. There is no need
to distinguish safe firms according to the technology they use: from the point of view of
banks and shareholders, who hold their debt and equity, they are identical. Let xHj and x
M
j










= 1 and that the amounts invested in firms with
technology j and `j equal to aH and aM are xHj (1− γ) and xMj (1− γ), respectively.
Suppose the bank chooses a level of deposits d. Since the safe banks pay aL for sure, the
bank will fail if and only if payment from the risky banks is less than d− γaL. Now suppose
that we split the bank into two banks, one of which funds safe firms and the other funds
risky firms. The safe bank invests one unit in safe firms and issues deposits dS = aL and







of risky firms and issues deposits
dR. The expected utility from the safe bank is denoted by US and the expected utility from
the risky bank is denoted by UR. What is the difference between these two banks and the
combined bank we started with? Note that the risky bank will default if and only if the
unified bank defaults with a positive probability. If there is no probability of default, there is
no difference in the expected utility generated by the two structures. On the other hand, if
there is a positive probability of default, the separated banks will generate a higher expected
utility, because the safe bank does not default whereas the combined bank does default in
some states. In fact, the gain in expected utility by separating the banks is precisely the
probability of default muliplied by the default cost (1− λb) dSb .
Thus, either there is no gain from mixing safe and risky debt in the banks portfolio or, if
the mixture of safe and risky debt causes the bank to default with positive probabilty, there
is a loss.






where xHj is the measure of firms of type j with `j = aH , x
M
j is the measure
of firms of type j with `j = aM , and we assume that no firms with `j = aL are included. The
portfolio x has no impact in states s = n + 1, n + 2 because all technologies have identical
payoffs in these states. Now consider the states s = 1, ..., n and let ρj denote the repayment
















Without essential loss of generality, we can order the types of firms so that ρj ≤ ρj+1 for j =
1, ..., n− 1. The bank wants to maximize the face value of deposits subject to the no-default






















The expected utility generated by the bank and the firms whose debt it holds will be









+ βδ (aM − d) + βε (aH − d)
= d+ βδ (aM − d) + βε (aH − d) .
Risky banks holding risky debt We split the analysis in two parts, considering first
that case where d ≤ aM and, second, the case where d > aM .
i) Suppose that there is a positive probability of the bank defaulting, but that d ≤ aM .
This means that default only occurs in states s = 1, ..., n. As before, the portfolio x is
irrelevant in states s = n + 1, n + 2 so we restrict attention to the states s = 1, ..., n. With
our usual convention that ρj ≤ ρj+1, there exists a technology k such that, d > ρj for
j = 1, ..., k and d ≤ ρj for j = k + 1, ..., n. (The bank will never choose to default with











































































































































































































because λb < 1 and
(




































































































































































































































































































































































































= 1. But the last expression in this series
of inequalities is the representative consumer’s expected utility when the bank lends only to
firms that use a single technology j and choose the capital structure ` = aM and the level of
deposits is d = aM . It is easy to check that for any other portfolio and face value of deposits
one of the inequalities is strict, so this is the unique policy that maximizes expected utility
in the states s = 1, ..., n when d ≤ aM and the probability of default is positive.
Now let us check that this policy is optimal in the states s = n+ 1, n+ 2. The expected






(aM + β (aH − aM)) .

























































(aM + β (aH − aM))
Thus, the unique optimal policy is to set d = aM and xMj = 1 for some j as long as d ≤ aM .
ii) Now consider the case in which d > aM . In that case, the bank always defaults



































(d+ β (aH − d)) .
The choice of d will be the maximum that allows the bank to remain solvent in state s = n+2,

















j , we can











(d+ β (aH − db))



























= (1, 0) must be an optimum. Since we assume that
d > aM , this case is only observed if xH = 1.
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Proof of Proposition 8.





β (aM − aL) .
If the representative bank issues safe debt (deposits) and lends to risky firms (` = aM), on























n− 1 − β
)
aL < aM .
Proof of Proposition 9
The argument in the proof of Proposition 7 left us with the following candidates for an
optimal bank policy.
1. The bank invests in firms with ` = aL and d = aL. The firms’types are irrelevant
because firm debt is risk free. The expected utility in equilibrium is
aL + β
(









+ δaM + εaH − aL.
2a. The bank invests in firms with ` = aM . The portfolio is defined by xMj =
1
n
for all j and



























2b. The bank invests in firms with ` = aM . The portfolio is defined by xMj = 1 for some j
and the face value of deposits is d = aM . The expected utility in equilibrium is









+ (δ + ε) aM + εβ (aH − aM) .
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3. The bank invests in firms with ` = aH . The portfolio is defined by xH = 1 (the
distribution over j is irrelevant) and the face value of deposits is d = aH . The expected
utility in equilibrium is
εaH + λb
(















































respectively. Finally, Proposition 9 guarantees that Case 2a dominates Case 1. Thus, Case
2a dominates all other cases for values of δ and ε suffi ciently close to zero.
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